Monday, 9 January 2012
Thursday, 27 October 2011
Michael Walzer's great "Just and Unjust Wars" and my unfair reappraisal?
Just and Unjust Wars has long been held as a manifesto against war-mongering and war-waging. The catalyst for Michael Walzer's writing the book was the wicked American intervention in the Vietnam War, against which he was an activist, and he has long since been a doyen of the American Left. I read the 1977 edition at University, and it seemed to me at the time to close off any moral notion for war except in self-defence, and to be strongly opposed to Great Power intervention. And yet when reading the 1992 edition this week in light of wars since then up to and including the successful Libyan uprising, I have had second thoughts. Are they wrong …. ?
Walzer gets himself into a pickle right from the start. The 1992 edition has a preface on Gulf War One, in which he reflects on the 1991 War in light of his theory, rather presupposing you have already read the book! He goes on to argue that Just War theory runs a middle course between contentious conceptions he has of realism and pacifism. Rather dangerously given other religions & their warfighting heritages, he charts the theory's origins in Christianity and attempts to establish it in a secular, modern context (Part One). I can only imagine that anyone who isn't either Christian or secular (most of the world) could quite easily reject Walzer's injunction against causing or conducting war altogether.
In Part Two The Theory of Aggression, he betrays himself with another dose of cultural dissonance when he underpins Just War theory with the very Western ideas of individual human rights and consent theory of state legitimacy. I'm not even sure that the Anglo-Saxon world even practises what Walzer preaches anymore.
But he hoists himself on his own petard when trying to reconcile his six propositions for his theory of aggression and his arguments subsequent. His six propositions are:
“1 There exists an international society of sovereign states.
2 This international society has law that establishes the right of its members – above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty.
3 Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act.
4 Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defence by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other member of international society.
5 Nothing but aggression can justify war.
6 Once the aggressor state has been militarily repulsed, it can also be punished.” (pp 61-2)
He then tests the strength of these propositions, and ends up arguing for ‘pre-emptive self-defence’; support for secessionist movements that are fighting for ‘national liberation’; balancing the intervention of other states in a civil war with counter-intervention; and, citing the Indian invasion of Bangladesh, rescuing populations threatened with enslavement or massacre. Nuclear deterrence, he argues, explodes the theory of just war.
Walzer's book is a classic because he so elegantly illustrates his moral arguments with so many famous historical case studies such as Thucydides’s story of the Melian Dialogue, the Allied bombing of Germany, and the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam. He supported the American justification of Gulf War One, believing that the United States and its allies were right not to march on Baghdad once Kuwait’s sovereignty was restored. He argued that liberation from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein was not an American responsibility: it was up to the citizens of Iraq, and those in Kuwait also, to rid themselves of despotic rule, he stated. As for the conduct of the war, he condemned the policy of destroying the infrastructure of Iraq, which he argued failed to distinguish adequately between military and civilian targets. He also criticised the air attacks on fleeing Iraqi soldiers at the end of the war, since the soldiers no longer posed a real threat to American or other allied troops. Despite also disagreeing with Bush Senior's rhetoric of a New World Order and a victory for democracy, he did not condemn the oil motive, arguing it was only a subsidiary one, or the selectivity of US policy against aggression as a good reason to abandon the theory.
Throughout the book there is a conflict between a commitment to universal rights and the right to self-determination. Second, there is a tension arising from his appeal to human rights as the basis of the war convention regarding jus in bello, and his appeal to limiting the right to go to war for the purpose of self-defence. By appealing to human rights as the basis of the war convention regarding the use of force once war has begun, and by conceding exceptions to the rule of non-intervention on grounds of human rights, Walzer creates problems for himself. If the legitimacy and sovereignty of states derives ultimately from the rights of individuals, then to the degree that a state violates human rights, it loses both its legitimacy and its sovereign rights, including the right to be protected by the principle of non-intervention.
There always has been and seems especially today to be such a clamour for “Justice!” that those who claim they have it deem themselves morally justified to go to and wage any war they want. And my re-reading of Michael Walzer's great book made me feel he gave them the weapons to do so. Is this unjust of me?
Friday, 17 December 2010
Business is War
Some have argued that business is not war: war has no client. However, because in Book 1 chapter 3 of “On War”, Carl von Clausewitz says:” "Rather than comparing [war] to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale”. So is business strategy like war?
Wars have been waged by commercial corporations (eg the Hanseatic League, the East India Company) for business objectives. There have always been mercenary armies, businesses that sell their military capabilities. Marxists argue that capitalism inheres war, and point at Gulf War 2.
On the other hand, some business strategists reject the business/war analogy, arguing that business is about the creation of value, whereas war is pure destruction. However, war is about the creation of political value. Thus politics involves creative destruction in much the same manner as business does. Joseph Schumpeter in 1942 coined the phrase “creative destruction” and used the term to describe the process of transformation that accompanies radical innovation, in his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, whereby innovation is the force that sustains long-term economic growth, even as it destroys the value of established companies and employees that enjoy some degree of monopoly power derived from previous technological, organisational, regulatory, and economic innovations. The point is that new developments destroy old, but better comes as a result: this is the parallel between war and business.
Strategy, therefore, is a source of insight into the nature of conflict, whether on the battlefield or in the boardroom.
GE’s legendary Jack Welch said in “Jack, Straight from the Gut” (2001, p447)
"Clausewitz summed up what it had all been about in his classic On War. Men could not reduce strategy to a formula. Detailed planning necessarily failed, due to the inevitable frictions encountered: chance events, imperfections in execution, and the independent will of the opposition. Instead, the human elements were paramount: leadership, morale, and the almost instinctive savvy of the best generals. The Prussian general staff, under the elder von Moltke, perfected these concepts in practice. They did not expect a plan of operations to survive beyond the first contact with the enemy. They set only the broadest of objectives and emphasised seizing unforeseen opportunities as they arose. Strategy was not a lengthy action plan. It was the evolution of a central idea through continually changing circumstances."
The Boston Consulting Group’s Strategy Institute chose as their very first book to publish, in 2001, “Clausewitz on Strategy: Inspiration and Insight From a Master Strategist”. In the field of business strategy, there is no better source than Clausewitz, they state.
Business and war share the notion of strategy, Clausewitz’ strength. He lived in times similar to ours in that business today is in an economic revolution, just as he experienced a military one. Then, as now, the old rules were rendered useless and the world was filled with uncertainty and constant change. Yet the true strategist welcomes such times. Uncertainty is an engine of transformation and the generator of new business opportunities. He recognised that the advantage conveyed by innovations lasts only until the enemy (or the competition) adopts them. In our turbulent times, businesspeople can learn new ways to prepare for competitive battles and wars by studying this major military strategist’s beliefs and adapting his way of thinking to the context of business.
The Genius of Strategy
Every activity requires specific aptitudes of the mind and heart. Military genius is a harmonious combination of personal qualities, and there can be many different combinations. In war, more than other human activities, strategists must make room for chance, however, the ability to prepare for chance is not primarily intellectual. Instead, warriors are constantly confronted by the unexpected. Therefore, to survive, you must have the vision to find the light that leads to truth, even in moments of darkness; and the courage, the determination, to follow that light. The French call the first coup l’oeil. In war, you need a flash of genius to sift through all forces and relationships in play to find the right course. A warrior needs the courage to face personal danger and responsibility. This kind of courage is an act of the heart, not of the mind. Here, determination relieves doubts and saves you from procrastination.
Commanders need not be scholars, but they must understand the politics and issues behind their struggles and the interests of the people involved. They must know the strengths, characters and capabilities of the people they lead, and must be able to estimate how they will perform in various conditions. This knowledge requires a talented mind.
This is why there has never been an outstanding commander who had a lesser mind. Those who describe war as an “art” or “science” focus only on material issues; that is why these metaphors are irrelevant. As war evolved and became more complex, scholars tried to invent principles and theories to describe it, but none of the theories captured the infinite difficulties of real warfare. Theoretical concepts may be useful tools for gaining insight, but in battle, talent and genius aren’t bound by theory. War is a trinity, made up of 1) innate violence, which is subject to blind hatred and instinct; 2) the interplay of probability and chance, which frees the mind to act creatively and 3) its subordinate nature as a political instrument, which is subject to pure reason. A theory that ignores any of these is worthless.
The Theatre of Strategy
War is closer to trade or politics than art, for both are conflicts of human interests and activities. War is set apart as an act of will against a person who reacts. One side must balance its efforts against its opponent’s ability to resist, as set by the opponent’s means and strength of will. War looks simple to those who’ve never experienced it. In fact, it is simple — but nonetheless very difficult. Infinite minor events create a friction that only those who’ve experienced war can grasp. The combination of this friction and the randomness of war has incalculable consequences. A good general must recognise this friction and never expect real-life operations to run precisely. Instead, generals must think in terms of probability. True, you try to leave as little to chance as possible, but that doesn’t mean the
most certain course is best. Sometimes generals should follow the most daring path instead.
Intelligence means the information you have about your enemy. Much of the intelligence generals get in war is contradictory, dubious or simply wrong. Furthermore, people naturally believe bad news more readily than good. A commander must lean toward hope, not give in to fear. Generals must stay true to their inner convictions even as they’re battered by bad news. Seeing things correctly in war is difficult, and so matters often look very different from what was expected. This is one great difference between planning and execution. A commander needs bravery and ambition, plus experience with danger, to reach even ordinary goals.
Thinking Strategy
War planning means planning combat. But combat is the sum of complete, individual acts, which we call engagements. Planning the use of your forces in engagements is tactics; joining them together to achieve the war’s objective is strategy. See engagements as links in a chain, each leading to the next, so that a momentary advantage doesn’t turn to a later disadvantage.
Battle is more the province of tactics than strategy. But strategy gives direction to battles and determines the plans for campaigns. Once a larger goal is clear, planning a strategy to reach it is easy, but it takes great clarity, confidence and character to stay with the plan amidst war’s jolts. Making strategic decisions is harder than making tactical ones. In tactics, the commander is caught up in the moment. Strategy offers time for deliberation, discussion and remorse. Thus, most generals get bogged down by fear when they should be acting.
In defence, you wait for the blow. Indeed, much of war is spent waiting. Sometimes it’s best to wait for the enemy’s attack, then respond with your attack at a better moment.
Waiting is the hallmark of defence and its main advantage. Attack and defence lead to each other. Every defence leads to a means of attack. In any engagement, three critical things lead to victory: surprise, advantageous terrain and attack from several sides. The attacker has only some surprise and a multi-pronged attack in his favour; the defender alone has maximum surprise, varied attack and all the advantage of terrain. Attackers can generate surprise only by using their full forces; defenders can create surprise with the strength and form of their attacks.
The attacker has a positive purpose, conquest, while the defence has a negative goal: preservation. Yet paradoxically, defensive war is inherently stronger than offence. It is natural in war to start on defence and end on offence. If you expect the future to be better than the present, stay on defence. If you think the future is more promising for the enemy, then attack. The third (and most common) situation is when neither side has any strong expectation for the future. In that event, the political aggressor takes the offensive. After waiting, the defence counterattacks.
If you have an advantage after the enemy’s attack, strike quickly. This transition to the attack is the vital element of defence. Just as defence leads to counterattack, so an attack that does not lead to peace must end on defence. The great weakness is that after an attack, the aggressor is in a poor position for defence. Don’t attack a capable enemy who is in a good position. In defence, caution is the true genius, while attackers need boldness and confidence. The weaker the defender’s morale, the more audacious the attack should be. The only real advantage of attack is the ability to achieve some surprise, which can cause confusion among the enemy, shattering his courage. However, the friction of war tends to dilute the advantages of surprise attack. Surprise can succeed, with favorable circumstances, but it rarely yields much benefit.
Numerical superiority is probably the most important advantage a commander can have in battle, but the advantage must be large enough to offset all others. Thus, focus the largest number of troops possible at the decisive point in the battle. Do not divide your forces without an urgent reason. All forces must be available at once. Using more force can often reduce losses, so commanders who use their forces economically are on the surest path to victory. Your battle plan should also be simple enough for you to attack before the enemy can interrupt your plans. Attack the core of an enemy’s strength, unless some secondary target offers extraordinary benefits. Thus, when you draft a war plan, recognise the enemy’s centre of power, then combine your forces against that centre in a single major action.
Fighting is always interrupted by pauses, long or short. These pauses come when neither side wants anything positive. When one side chooses a new positive goal, acts to achieve it and meets resistance from the other side, there’s a tension of forces. A measure taken during a state of tension is more important, and yields greater results, than it would during a pause. Generals must recognise these states of equilibrium and tension, and then act accordingly. Often one side does not completely defeat the other, but instead a culminating moment occurs when one side reaches its main objective. This is a dangerous moment for the victor. If the overextended, exhausted victor overshoots the goal, the enemy often responds with a destructive counterattack. A commander must know when to halt the attack.
The Virtues of Strategy
Moral forces are a vital topic in war. Any theory of war must acknowledge their power, but they are not easily defined or codified. In war, the main moral powers are the general’s talents, the army’s military skills and popular sentiment. When all armies seem similarly skilled, sentiment and the army’s excellence play a larger role.
Military virtues go beyond mere courage. Courage, while needed, must submit to a chain of command. Since the individual’s role in war cannot be eliminated, an army needs esprit de corps, which gives it cohesion and crystallises its skills. An excellent army is one that stays in order under fire, resists fear, stays obedient even in defeat, and remains confident in its generals. This military virtue is to the individual what the general’s genius is to the whole. This spirit comes only from many victories, or rigorous training. War is a composite of the battles fought by each soldier, and victory is the sum of their victories.
A commander’s virtues must include boldness, but as a general moves up the chain of command, boldness must be paired with a superior mind, so it doesn’t become blind emotion. Generals must have perseverance, so that they are not diverted by mistakes, misinformation and uncertainty. They must also have great self-control, a character that does not lose its balance in the face of the strongest passions.
Beyond Strategy
Only start a war if you intend to pursue both your immediate and your ultimate goals with full strength and effort. It is a serious means to a serious end. War always arises from a policy motive. It is the result of pulsating tensions that grow strong enough to burst into fighting, but it always remains under the control of a guiding intelligence.
Therefore, war is always influenced by policy. It is, then, an extension of political will by other means. Those means must conform with the policy goal; they can never be separated from the ends.
War Gaming
Here’s what I believe. CvC’s thoughts are fascinating, but I feel they are useful to business strategists as illustrations or analogies. Business strategy more closely equates to military strategy in war-gaming. War-gaming is something that I and all the other Aberystwyth students in the War, Politics & Strategy group know well and have studied.
War gaming is a technique that uses in-depth role-playing. Few business managers outside of the top ranks have ever participated in a war game. Straightforward war games can help any manager make better competitive decisions. War games are useful to prepare for market shifts, experiment with strategies, manage new initiatives, create support for a business case, diagnose its deficiencies, and attack – or defend against – your competitors. War games can break through conventional wisdom, reveal crucial data gaps, create support for a campaign and improve awareness of your firm’s position.
War games involve acting out various roles. Preparation includes researching competitors and other parties whose decisions may change the field of play. Live role-playing works best, especially when a decision or a plan is at stake, and the wrong decision will be costly.
Famous Games
War games go back a long way. Frederick the Great carried a war game kit. In the 1800s, Otto von Bismarck studied probable political responses to his plans, and devised strategies that united Germany. In 1976, Israeli forces used a thorough, detailed war game to plan the rescue of hostages held in Entebbe, Uganda. They role-played the hijackers, who had taken over an Air France flight between Tel Aviv and Paris, and the Ugandan sentries, officers, radar operators and other potential participants on the ground, including erratic Ugandan leader, Idi Amin. Israel’s successful rescue mission took about 90 minutes, thanks to thorough, realistic war game preparation.
In the 2002 Millennium Challenge, a $250-million war game exercise, some 13,500 participants enacted a hypothetical US military campaign against an unnamed Middle Eastern opponent. The Blue Team represented the US at a time when Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld wanted to reshape its military into a technological powerhouse.
Paul Van Riper, retired head of the Marines’ Combat Development Council, led the hypothetical Middle Eastern Red Team. Red humiliated Blue with unconventional tactics, rendering Blue’s high-tech military power all but impotent. For instance, Red sank Blue’s navy with suicide attacks. This was so unexpected and unwelcome that the game’s organisers vetoed it. They resurrected Blue’s navy and told Van Riper to disable Red’s air defences so Blue could attack successfully. Rumsfeld’s team declared victory, having followed a script, but not having played a genuine war game. They took the US to war in Iraq using tactics they believed should, in all rightness, have won both the Challenge and the actual war. Van Riper soon quit. We are now living with the consequences. Business leaders are too.
Wars have been waged by commercial corporations (eg the Hanseatic League, the East India Company) for business objectives. There have always been mercenary armies, businesses that sell their military capabilities. Marxists argue that capitalism inheres war, and point at Gulf War 2.
On the other hand, some business strategists reject the business/war analogy, arguing that business is about the creation of value, whereas war is pure destruction. However, war is about the creation of political value. Thus politics involves creative destruction in much the same manner as business does. Joseph Schumpeter in 1942 coined the phrase “creative destruction” and used the term to describe the process of transformation that accompanies radical innovation, in his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, whereby innovation is the force that sustains long-term economic growth, even as it destroys the value of established companies and employees that enjoy some degree of monopoly power derived from previous technological, organisational, regulatory, and economic innovations. The point is that new developments destroy old, but better comes as a result: this is the parallel between war and business.
Strategy, therefore, is a source of insight into the nature of conflict, whether on the battlefield or in the boardroom.
GE’s legendary Jack Welch said in “Jack, Straight from the Gut” (2001, p447)
"Clausewitz summed up what it had all been about in his classic On War. Men could not reduce strategy to a formula. Detailed planning necessarily failed, due to the inevitable frictions encountered: chance events, imperfections in execution, and the independent will of the opposition. Instead, the human elements were paramount: leadership, morale, and the almost instinctive savvy of the best generals. The Prussian general staff, under the elder von Moltke, perfected these concepts in practice. They did not expect a plan of operations to survive beyond the first contact with the enemy. They set only the broadest of objectives and emphasised seizing unforeseen opportunities as they arose. Strategy was not a lengthy action plan. It was the evolution of a central idea through continually changing circumstances."
The Boston Consulting Group’s Strategy Institute chose as their very first book to publish, in 2001, “Clausewitz on Strategy: Inspiration and Insight From a Master Strategist”. In the field of business strategy, there is no better source than Clausewitz, they state.
Business and war share the notion of strategy, Clausewitz’ strength. He lived in times similar to ours in that business today is in an economic revolution, just as he experienced a military one. Then, as now, the old rules were rendered useless and the world was filled with uncertainty and constant change. Yet the true strategist welcomes such times. Uncertainty is an engine of transformation and the generator of new business opportunities. He recognised that the advantage conveyed by innovations lasts only until the enemy (or the competition) adopts them. In our turbulent times, businesspeople can learn new ways to prepare for competitive battles and wars by studying this major military strategist’s beliefs and adapting his way of thinking to the context of business.
The Genius of Strategy
Every activity requires specific aptitudes of the mind and heart. Military genius is a harmonious combination of personal qualities, and there can be many different combinations. In war, more than other human activities, strategists must make room for chance, however, the ability to prepare for chance is not primarily intellectual. Instead, warriors are constantly confronted by the unexpected. Therefore, to survive, you must have the vision to find the light that leads to truth, even in moments of darkness; and the courage, the determination, to follow that light. The French call the first coup l’oeil. In war, you need a flash of genius to sift through all forces and relationships in play to find the right course. A warrior needs the courage to face personal danger and responsibility. This kind of courage is an act of the heart, not of the mind. Here, determination relieves doubts and saves you from procrastination.
Commanders need not be scholars, but they must understand the politics and issues behind their struggles and the interests of the people involved. They must know the strengths, characters and capabilities of the people they lead, and must be able to estimate how they will perform in various conditions. This knowledge requires a talented mind.
This is why there has never been an outstanding commander who had a lesser mind. Those who describe war as an “art” or “science” focus only on material issues; that is why these metaphors are irrelevant. As war evolved and became more complex, scholars tried to invent principles and theories to describe it, but none of the theories captured the infinite difficulties of real warfare. Theoretical concepts may be useful tools for gaining insight, but in battle, talent and genius aren’t bound by theory. War is a trinity, made up of 1) innate violence, which is subject to blind hatred and instinct; 2) the interplay of probability and chance, which frees the mind to act creatively and 3) its subordinate nature as a political instrument, which is subject to pure reason. A theory that ignores any of these is worthless.
The Theatre of Strategy
War is closer to trade or politics than art, for both are conflicts of human interests and activities. War is set apart as an act of will against a person who reacts. One side must balance its efforts against its opponent’s ability to resist, as set by the opponent’s means and strength of will. War looks simple to those who’ve never experienced it. In fact, it is simple — but nonetheless very difficult. Infinite minor events create a friction that only those who’ve experienced war can grasp. The combination of this friction and the randomness of war has incalculable consequences. A good general must recognise this friction and never expect real-life operations to run precisely. Instead, generals must think in terms of probability. True, you try to leave as little to chance as possible, but that doesn’t mean the
most certain course is best. Sometimes generals should follow the most daring path instead.
Intelligence means the information you have about your enemy. Much of the intelligence generals get in war is contradictory, dubious or simply wrong. Furthermore, people naturally believe bad news more readily than good. A commander must lean toward hope, not give in to fear. Generals must stay true to their inner convictions even as they’re battered by bad news. Seeing things correctly in war is difficult, and so matters often look very different from what was expected. This is one great difference between planning and execution. A commander needs bravery and ambition, plus experience with danger, to reach even ordinary goals.
Thinking Strategy
War planning means planning combat. But combat is the sum of complete, individual acts, which we call engagements. Planning the use of your forces in engagements is tactics; joining them together to achieve the war’s objective is strategy. See engagements as links in a chain, each leading to the next, so that a momentary advantage doesn’t turn to a later disadvantage.
Battle is more the province of tactics than strategy. But strategy gives direction to battles and determines the plans for campaigns. Once a larger goal is clear, planning a strategy to reach it is easy, but it takes great clarity, confidence and character to stay with the plan amidst war’s jolts. Making strategic decisions is harder than making tactical ones. In tactics, the commander is caught up in the moment. Strategy offers time for deliberation, discussion and remorse. Thus, most generals get bogged down by fear when they should be acting.
In defence, you wait for the blow. Indeed, much of war is spent waiting. Sometimes it’s best to wait for the enemy’s attack, then respond with your attack at a better moment.
Waiting is the hallmark of defence and its main advantage. Attack and defence lead to each other. Every defence leads to a means of attack. In any engagement, three critical things lead to victory: surprise, advantageous terrain and attack from several sides. The attacker has only some surprise and a multi-pronged attack in his favour; the defender alone has maximum surprise, varied attack and all the advantage of terrain. Attackers can generate surprise only by using their full forces; defenders can create surprise with the strength and form of their attacks.
The attacker has a positive purpose, conquest, while the defence has a negative goal: preservation. Yet paradoxically, defensive war is inherently stronger than offence. It is natural in war to start on defence and end on offence. If you expect the future to be better than the present, stay on defence. If you think the future is more promising for the enemy, then attack. The third (and most common) situation is when neither side has any strong expectation for the future. In that event, the political aggressor takes the offensive. After waiting, the defence counterattacks.
If you have an advantage after the enemy’s attack, strike quickly. This transition to the attack is the vital element of defence. Just as defence leads to counterattack, so an attack that does not lead to peace must end on defence. The great weakness is that after an attack, the aggressor is in a poor position for defence. Don’t attack a capable enemy who is in a good position. In defence, caution is the true genius, while attackers need boldness and confidence. The weaker the defender’s morale, the more audacious the attack should be. The only real advantage of attack is the ability to achieve some surprise, which can cause confusion among the enemy, shattering his courage. However, the friction of war tends to dilute the advantages of surprise attack. Surprise can succeed, with favorable circumstances, but it rarely yields much benefit.
Numerical superiority is probably the most important advantage a commander can have in battle, but the advantage must be large enough to offset all others. Thus, focus the largest number of troops possible at the decisive point in the battle. Do not divide your forces without an urgent reason. All forces must be available at once. Using more force can often reduce losses, so commanders who use their forces economically are on the surest path to victory. Your battle plan should also be simple enough for you to attack before the enemy can interrupt your plans. Attack the core of an enemy’s strength, unless some secondary target offers extraordinary benefits. Thus, when you draft a war plan, recognise the enemy’s centre of power, then combine your forces against that centre in a single major action.
Fighting is always interrupted by pauses, long or short. These pauses come when neither side wants anything positive. When one side chooses a new positive goal, acts to achieve it and meets resistance from the other side, there’s a tension of forces. A measure taken during a state of tension is more important, and yields greater results, than it would during a pause. Generals must recognise these states of equilibrium and tension, and then act accordingly. Often one side does not completely defeat the other, but instead a culminating moment occurs when one side reaches its main objective. This is a dangerous moment for the victor. If the overextended, exhausted victor overshoots the goal, the enemy often responds with a destructive counterattack. A commander must know when to halt the attack.
The Virtues of Strategy
Moral forces are a vital topic in war. Any theory of war must acknowledge their power, but they are not easily defined or codified. In war, the main moral powers are the general’s talents, the army’s military skills and popular sentiment. When all armies seem similarly skilled, sentiment and the army’s excellence play a larger role.
Military virtues go beyond mere courage. Courage, while needed, must submit to a chain of command. Since the individual’s role in war cannot be eliminated, an army needs esprit de corps, which gives it cohesion and crystallises its skills. An excellent army is one that stays in order under fire, resists fear, stays obedient even in defeat, and remains confident in its generals. This military virtue is to the individual what the general’s genius is to the whole. This spirit comes only from many victories, or rigorous training. War is a composite of the battles fought by each soldier, and victory is the sum of their victories.
A commander’s virtues must include boldness, but as a general moves up the chain of command, boldness must be paired with a superior mind, so it doesn’t become blind emotion. Generals must have perseverance, so that they are not diverted by mistakes, misinformation and uncertainty. They must also have great self-control, a character that does not lose its balance in the face of the strongest passions.
Beyond Strategy
Only start a war if you intend to pursue both your immediate and your ultimate goals with full strength and effort. It is a serious means to a serious end. War always arises from a policy motive. It is the result of pulsating tensions that grow strong enough to burst into fighting, but it always remains under the control of a guiding intelligence.
Therefore, war is always influenced by policy. It is, then, an extension of political will by other means. Those means must conform with the policy goal; they can never be separated from the ends.
War Gaming
Here’s what I believe. CvC’s thoughts are fascinating, but I feel they are useful to business strategists as illustrations or analogies. Business strategy more closely equates to military strategy in war-gaming. War-gaming is something that I and all the other Aberystwyth students in the War, Politics & Strategy group know well and have studied.
War gaming is a technique that uses in-depth role-playing. Few business managers outside of the top ranks have ever participated in a war game. Straightforward war games can help any manager make better competitive decisions. War games are useful to prepare for market shifts, experiment with strategies, manage new initiatives, create support for a business case, diagnose its deficiencies, and attack – or defend against – your competitors. War games can break through conventional wisdom, reveal crucial data gaps, create support for a campaign and improve awareness of your firm’s position.
War games involve acting out various roles. Preparation includes researching competitors and other parties whose decisions may change the field of play. Live role-playing works best, especially when a decision or a plan is at stake, and the wrong decision will be costly.
Famous Games
War games go back a long way. Frederick the Great carried a war game kit. In the 1800s, Otto von Bismarck studied probable political responses to his plans, and devised strategies that united Germany. In 1976, Israeli forces used a thorough, detailed war game to plan the rescue of hostages held in Entebbe, Uganda. They role-played the hijackers, who had taken over an Air France flight between Tel Aviv and Paris, and the Ugandan sentries, officers, radar operators and other potential participants on the ground, including erratic Ugandan leader, Idi Amin. Israel’s successful rescue mission took about 90 minutes, thanks to thorough, realistic war game preparation.
In the 2002 Millennium Challenge, a $250-million war game exercise, some 13,500 participants enacted a hypothetical US military campaign against an unnamed Middle Eastern opponent. The Blue Team represented the US at a time when Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld wanted to reshape its military into a technological powerhouse.
Paul Van Riper, retired head of the Marines’ Combat Development Council, led the hypothetical Middle Eastern Red Team. Red humiliated Blue with unconventional tactics, rendering Blue’s high-tech military power all but impotent. For instance, Red sank Blue’s navy with suicide attacks. This was so unexpected and unwelcome that the game’s organisers vetoed it. They resurrected Blue’s navy and told Van Riper to disable Red’s air defences so Blue could attack successfully. Rumsfeld’s team declared victory, having followed a script, but not having played a genuine war game. They took the US to war in Iraq using tactics they believed should, in all rightness, have won both the Challenge and the actual war. Van Riper soon quit. We are now living with the consequences. Business leaders are too.
Thursday, 11 February 2010
Man, the State, and War, Kenneth Waltz, 1959
Iran started enriching its own uranium this week. Why, if nuclear weapons ushered in an era of unprecedented peace, growth and wealth for those possessing them, should we not welcome the spread of nuclear weapons? Have the nuclear haves not always credited nuclear deterrence for banishing war between nuclear weapons states? This is the argument that Kenneth Waltz made in 1981, renewed in 2003, and which surely begs bringing back again this week.
Waltz's argument stems directly from the logic of nuclear deterrence and the balance of power, a concept he reinvigorated in his seminal text "Man, the State, and War". He starts by asking where the causes of war are to be found, and posits that they are to be found somewhere in the now-famous three “images” or levels of analysis in international politics. The first is human “behavior” (chapter 2), or more succinctly, human nature. If the causes of war are to be found here, one must divine the nature of human behaviour. Of course, there are as many views on human nature as humans on the planet, and thus how to secure peace will be equally indeterminate. Waltz counters all the human nature solutions to the causes of war and peace as being reductionist in chapter 3: by trying to explain everything, human behaviour images explain nothing. However, where I think this image could give clarity would be in focusing on decision-makers (heads of state, diplomats, generals, and so on) and their role in causing war and peace.
Waltz then looks in chapter 4 at a second image: domestic politics, or “the internal structure of states”. All political theories have a conception of the "good" state which is (with the exception of militarism) a peaceful one. We all know that democracies have never fought each other, the trouble is that there is little agreement as to what a democratic state consists of, let alone whether that is the only “good” state. Socialism has always been smug about its credentials of being good and peaceful; certainly, before the First World War, international socialists (ch5) believed that they could prevent war but they all ended up fighting for their own states. However, in these two chapters Waltz does highlight the importance of a state’s power, or its ability to act, and this along with the human behaviour of individual and group decision-makers will prove important when looking at all three images together. Just as the societies they live in make men, so the international environment makes states (page 122); the scene is set, therefore, to look at the third and final image which examines this international environment which makes states.
Chapter 6 introduces the international anarchy. With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire - conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur. To achieve a favorable outcome from such a conflict, a state has to rely on its own devices, the relative efficiency of which is its constant concern (p159).
In anarchy, there is no automatic harmony. Because some countries may be willing to use force to achieve their ends, and because there is no authority to prevent them from doing so, even peacefully inclined states arm themselves. Goodness and evil, agreement and disagreement, may or may not lead to war. War occurs because there is nothing to prevent it: there is no automatic adjustment of interests among states and there is a constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force (p188).
A balance of power may exist because some countries consciously make it the end of their policies, but it mainly exists because the system forces an equilibrium. It is not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by events on statesmen (p209).
The third image describes the framework of international politics, but without the first and the second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in international politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results (p238).
For Waltz, anarchy, or the absence of central authority, is the ordering principle of the international system. By analogy to microeconomic theory (ch7), Waltz argues that international systems emerge from self-regarding units coming into contact with each other. In a microtheory, whether economic or political, the motivation of actors is assumed rather than realistically described. Waltz assumes that states seek to ensure their survival. The real aims of states may be endlessly variable, but in a world without security, survival is the foundation for the theory.
Anarchy does not imply that violence is common in the international system but rather that the threat of violence is ever present. Anarchy means that the international system is one of self-help. Waltz identifies two ways in which the structure of the international system limits cooperation. First, the condition of insecurity--at the least, the uncertainty of each about the other's future intentions and actions--works against their cooperation. A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favour another state more than itself. Second, a state is also concerned about becoming dependent on others, and therefore also chooses to limit its cooperation with other states. Waltz sees virtues in anarchy--principally that states can preserve their autonomy.
While Waltz recognizes the existence of non-state actors, he dismisses their importance because states are still the most powerful actors on the world stage--they have the most influence and they set the rules. Thus, the international system is defined in terms of states.
The nature of the international system is determined by the number of Great Powers. The structure of the international system changes with changes in the distribution of power, and this is where the second level starts to play a larger role.
His Balance of Power Theory (pages 116-128 in chapter 6) is worthy of close reading and noting:
1. States are unitary actors who seek, at a minimum, their own preservation and, at a maximum, universal domination.
2. States seek to achieve their goals either through internal balancing (increasing economic and military strength) or external balancing (creating alliances).
3. For this theory to operate, we must see two or more states in a self-help system with no superior authority over them.
Finally, Waltz contrasts balancing with bandwagoning, in which weaker states choose to ally with the stronger state. Waltz argues that because power is a means not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions. Again, the structure of the international system and the necessity of survival dictate this behaviour.
In chapter 8, Waltz investigates how changes in the structure of the international system affect alliances. He focuses, in particular, on the difference between multipolar and bipolar alliance systems.
The primary difference between multipolar and bipolar balancing is that multipolar balancing occurs externally (among states), while bipolar balancing occurs internally. Because external balancing is more uncertain, bipolar balancing tends to produce less conflict.
Waltz discusses several additional features of multipolar balancing:
* States will woo alliance partners by adapting to them. Example: France and Russia attempting to appear more alike one another in order to form their alliance in 1894.
* For security, states are willing to align with anyone
* The weaker partner in an alliance will determine policy in a moment of crisis
* International competition will tend to force states in a multipolar order into two blocs.
* Having two blocs does not mean that the system is bipolar, because alliance shifts and defections can still occur.
* These alliance shifts and defections make the multipolar order dangerous.
* The flexibility of alliances makes for rigidity in strategy.
For bipolar alliances:
* Alliance leaders do not need to worry much about the faithfulness of followers.
* In bipolar systems, there will be unequal burden-sharing between the major and minor powers in an alliance.
* Great Powers in a bipolar system do not need to make themselves attractive to alliance partners. For example, the Soviet Union and the USA did not alter their strategies to accommodate allies
* The rigidity of bipolar alliances makes for flexible strategy
Criticisms: there is often not a balance but an imbalance created – in the EU, the weaker states seem to fawn on France and Germany and do their will; look at how everyone flocked to Microsoft Windows and all but abandoned Unix; likewise Google's 70%+ share of the search engine market; and not many will try to argue that the market is self-righting during this credit crunch (though quite clearly it is, with a vengeance)!
Waltz’ analysis underpins so many other famous texts that have come after his , including a number of the books I have reviewed in this blog. Another key text in the understanding of War, Politics & Strategy - Barry Buzan’s People States and Fear (which I will have to dust off and review) overtly uses Waltz’s three levels of analysis to study the concept of security.
Kenneth Payne in his Discussion Analogies and Afghanistan elegantly argued against placing too much emphasis on analogies, but Waltz's key contribution is to explain recurring patterns of state behaviour throughout history.
Experts may dispute how he explains the first two levels, and how these interact with each other, but they will all agree that his three-level analysis is a powerful way of comprehending the incomprehensible of parts of international politics. Waltz is in his element when he talks about the third level and argues that the world exists in a state of perpetual international anarchy.
Another great strength of Waltz’ analysis is his explanation of the function of Great Powers (and extrapolating from that, SuperPowers) in the interstate structure. It is upon this analysis that I commend his 1981 IISS Adelphi Paper on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons to you, and ask for your contribution in the light of the current hoo-haa over Iran.
Waltz's argument stems directly from the logic of nuclear deterrence and the balance of power, a concept he reinvigorated in his seminal text "Man, the State, and War". He starts by asking where the causes of war are to be found, and posits that they are to be found somewhere in the now-famous three “images” or levels of analysis in international politics. The first is human “behavior” (chapter 2), or more succinctly, human nature. If the causes of war are to be found here, one must divine the nature of human behaviour. Of course, there are as many views on human nature as humans on the planet, and thus how to secure peace will be equally indeterminate. Waltz counters all the human nature solutions to the causes of war and peace as being reductionist in chapter 3: by trying to explain everything, human behaviour images explain nothing. However, where I think this image could give clarity would be in focusing on decision-makers (heads of state, diplomats, generals, and so on) and their role in causing war and peace.
Waltz then looks in chapter 4 at a second image: domestic politics, or “the internal structure of states”. All political theories have a conception of the "good" state which is (with the exception of militarism) a peaceful one. We all know that democracies have never fought each other, the trouble is that there is little agreement as to what a democratic state consists of, let alone whether that is the only “good” state. Socialism has always been smug about its credentials of being good and peaceful; certainly, before the First World War, international socialists (ch5) believed that they could prevent war but they all ended up fighting for their own states. However, in these two chapters Waltz does highlight the importance of a state’s power, or its ability to act, and this along with the human behaviour of individual and group decision-makers will prove important when looking at all three images together. Just as the societies they live in make men, so the international environment makes states (page 122); the scene is set, therefore, to look at the third and final image which examines this international environment which makes states.
Chapter 6 introduces the international anarchy. With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire - conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur. To achieve a favorable outcome from such a conflict, a state has to rely on its own devices, the relative efficiency of which is its constant concern (p159).
In anarchy, there is no automatic harmony. Because some countries may be willing to use force to achieve their ends, and because there is no authority to prevent them from doing so, even peacefully inclined states arm themselves. Goodness and evil, agreement and disagreement, may or may not lead to war. War occurs because there is nothing to prevent it: there is no automatic adjustment of interests among states and there is a constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force (p188).
A balance of power may exist because some countries consciously make it the end of their policies, but it mainly exists because the system forces an equilibrium. It is not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by events on statesmen (p209).
The third image describes the framework of international politics, but without the first and the second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in international politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results (p238).
For Waltz, anarchy, or the absence of central authority, is the ordering principle of the international system. By analogy to microeconomic theory (ch7), Waltz argues that international systems emerge from self-regarding units coming into contact with each other. In a microtheory, whether economic or political, the motivation of actors is assumed rather than realistically described. Waltz assumes that states seek to ensure their survival. The real aims of states may be endlessly variable, but in a world without security, survival is the foundation for the theory.
Anarchy does not imply that violence is common in the international system but rather that the threat of violence is ever present. Anarchy means that the international system is one of self-help. Waltz identifies two ways in which the structure of the international system limits cooperation. First, the condition of insecurity--at the least, the uncertainty of each about the other's future intentions and actions--works against their cooperation. A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favour another state more than itself. Second, a state is also concerned about becoming dependent on others, and therefore also chooses to limit its cooperation with other states. Waltz sees virtues in anarchy--principally that states can preserve their autonomy.
While Waltz recognizes the existence of non-state actors, he dismisses their importance because states are still the most powerful actors on the world stage--they have the most influence and they set the rules. Thus, the international system is defined in terms of states.
The nature of the international system is determined by the number of Great Powers. The structure of the international system changes with changes in the distribution of power, and this is where the second level starts to play a larger role.
His Balance of Power Theory (pages 116-128 in chapter 6) is worthy of close reading and noting:
1. States are unitary actors who seek, at a minimum, their own preservation and, at a maximum, universal domination.
2. States seek to achieve their goals either through internal balancing (increasing economic and military strength) or external balancing (creating alliances).
3. For this theory to operate, we must see two or more states in a self-help system with no superior authority over them.
Finally, Waltz contrasts balancing with bandwagoning, in which weaker states choose to ally with the stronger state. Waltz argues that because power is a means not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions. Again, the structure of the international system and the necessity of survival dictate this behaviour.
In chapter 8, Waltz investigates how changes in the structure of the international system affect alliances. He focuses, in particular, on the difference between multipolar and bipolar alliance systems.
The primary difference between multipolar and bipolar balancing is that multipolar balancing occurs externally (among states), while bipolar balancing occurs internally. Because external balancing is more uncertain, bipolar balancing tends to produce less conflict.
Waltz discusses several additional features of multipolar balancing:
* States will woo alliance partners by adapting to them. Example: France and Russia attempting to appear more alike one another in order to form their alliance in 1894.
* For security, states are willing to align with anyone
* The weaker partner in an alliance will determine policy in a moment of crisis
* International competition will tend to force states in a multipolar order into two blocs.
* Having two blocs does not mean that the system is bipolar, because alliance shifts and defections can still occur.
* These alliance shifts and defections make the multipolar order dangerous.
* The flexibility of alliances makes for rigidity in strategy.
For bipolar alliances:
* Alliance leaders do not need to worry much about the faithfulness of followers.
* In bipolar systems, there will be unequal burden-sharing between the major and minor powers in an alliance.
* Great Powers in a bipolar system do not need to make themselves attractive to alliance partners. For example, the Soviet Union and the USA did not alter their strategies to accommodate allies
* The rigidity of bipolar alliances makes for flexible strategy
Criticisms: there is often not a balance but an imbalance created – in the EU, the weaker states seem to fawn on France and Germany and do their will; look at how everyone flocked to Microsoft Windows and all but abandoned Unix; likewise Google's 70%+ share of the search engine market; and not many will try to argue that the market is self-righting during this credit crunch (though quite clearly it is, with a vengeance)!
Waltz’ analysis underpins so many other famous texts that have come after his , including a number of the books I have reviewed in this blog. Another key text in the understanding of War, Politics & Strategy - Barry Buzan’s People States and Fear (which I will have to dust off and review) overtly uses Waltz’s three levels of analysis to study the concept of security.
Kenneth Payne in his Discussion Analogies and Afghanistan elegantly argued against placing too much emphasis on analogies, but Waltz's key contribution is to explain recurring patterns of state behaviour throughout history.
Experts may dispute how he explains the first two levels, and how these interact with each other, but they will all agree that his three-level analysis is a powerful way of comprehending the incomprehensible of parts of international politics. Waltz is in his element when he talks about the third level and argues that the world exists in a state of perpetual international anarchy.
Another great strength of Waltz’ analysis is his explanation of the function of Great Powers (and extrapolating from that, SuperPowers) in the interstate structure. It is upon this analysis that I commend his 1981 IISS Adelphi Paper on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons to you, and ask for your contribution in the light of the current hoo-haa over Iran.
Sunday, 11 October 2009
The War of the World: History’s Age of Hatred (UK) / Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (US), Niall Ferguson, 2006
I had been very rude about this book when it first came out. His Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (1997) had been very clever, so I was disappointed that War of the World seemed reductionist, populist, and intellectually sloppy. Had he gone to a University overseas, I wondered to myself? Yes, he had indeed and was thus no longer face-to-face with hyper-critical British academics jealous maybe of his new-found TV fame and so doubly keen to demolish his arguments before they came to print.
But then in 2008 he published The Ascent of Money examining the long history of money, credit, and banking. In it he predicted financial catastrophe as a result of the United States using too much credit. Specifically he cited the China–America dynamic which he refers to as “Chimerica” where an Asian "savings glut" helped create the subprime mortgage crisis with an influx of easy money. This book was brilliant, just as Virtual History had been, and proved to be prophetic, so maybe my dismissal of War of the World had been wrong. This is what I thought when re-reading it …..
In the first eight pages of his Introduction “The Lethal Century”, he lays out his argument: what makes the 20th century remarkable is its exceptional violence. "The hundred years after 1900 were without question the bloodiest century in history, far more violent in relative as well as absolute terms than any previous era." Why? He rejects all the intense debates there have been about last century’s wars and ventures his own causes!
According to Ferguson, the 20th-century bloodbath was the result of the murderous interplay between of racial conflict, economic volatility and empires in decline. The 1900s saw wave upon wave of ethnic strife thanks to a race "meme" entering public perception. Across the world, the idea of biologically distinct races took hold of the 20th century mindset to deadly effect. His favorable explanation of socio-biology is unnerving politically, but more importantly is claiming too much for biological determinism, and the link from biology to political decision-makjng is just too populist and nebulous.
A sharp rise in assimilation, highly PC nowadays in the West at least, because mixing of the races supposedly leads to greater understanding and peace, “may actually be the prelude to ethnic conflict,” he writes. For example, intermarriage of Jews with non-Jews was 1 in 3 in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1920s (and as high as 1 in 2 in some cities). Ferguson illustrates that in Germany, Jewish intermarriage rose from 2 percent in 1902 to 28 percent in 1933. These and other stats quoted by Ferguson prove nothing, of course, and support the arguments of neither persuasion.
Tensions along increasingly conscious ethnic faultlines frequently spilt over into conflict during periods of economic volatility. For extremities of wealth and poverty proved far more incendiary than the steady, immiserating effects of economic depression. When ethnicity and financial turbulence then occurred in the context of retreating or expanding empires - British, German, or Soviet - the capacity for bloodshed proved even greater, Ferguson argues. Better take out life insurance, everyone, because Ferguson is surely suggesting that what we’re going through now – levels of migration and market volatility unparalleled in any period – will lead to the biggest and bloodiest war ever. It’s nonsense!
He began to think “the war” was more a collection of multiple regional conflicts, whose origins and conclusions stretched beyond the usually accepted boundaries of 1939-1945—the war against China began in 1937, even 1931; and the one against the British, Dutch, and French empires ended in 1942. This argument is probably the most embarrassing and damaging to Ferguson because the title of his book is War of the World. The Second World War was so-called because at least one combatant, the UK, was a World Power and engaged its forces and resources generally globally and totally from September 1939 until August 1945. Before and after those dates there were wars, indeed, but they engaged regional powers only, or World Powers only in a limited way. .
From the Russian Revolution in 1905 to the massacres in Bosnia in the 1990s, Ferguson sees the world at war almost continuously throughout the last century. There weren't two world wars and a Cold War, but rather a single Hundred Years' War, he argues. If you like this sort of Big Picture, MegaTrends approach, the arguments behind two books will outlive Ferguson’s, EH Carr’s The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939 (1939) and Philip Bobbitt's The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (2002) on which sort of 20th century industrial nation state -- fascist, communist or parliamentarian -- would succeed to the legitimacy previously enjoyed by imperial state-nations in the 19th century. Personally I prefer a less bug-eyed view of history, The view that the 20th Century was one of Decline in the West and horrendous Death is incorrect and partial at best. As one who saw the pulling-down of the Berlin Wall first-hand and thought the collapse of the Soviet Empire a peaceful one, I have to say that an equally valid opinion of the 20th Century is one of peace, progress and prosperity, and one in which the whole world was bequeathed and wholeheartedly embraced the weltanschauung of the West.
But then in 2008 he published The Ascent of Money examining the long history of money, credit, and banking. In it he predicted financial catastrophe as a result of the United States using too much credit. Specifically he cited the China–America dynamic which he refers to as “Chimerica” where an Asian "savings glut" helped create the subprime mortgage crisis with an influx of easy money. This book was brilliant, just as Virtual History had been, and proved to be prophetic, so maybe my dismissal of War of the World had been wrong. This is what I thought when re-reading it …..
In the first eight pages of his Introduction “The Lethal Century”, he lays out his argument: what makes the 20th century remarkable is its exceptional violence. "The hundred years after 1900 were without question the bloodiest century in history, far more violent in relative as well as absolute terms than any previous era." Why? He rejects all the intense debates there have been about last century’s wars and ventures his own causes!
According to Ferguson, the 20th-century bloodbath was the result of the murderous interplay between of racial conflict, economic volatility and empires in decline. The 1900s saw wave upon wave of ethnic strife thanks to a race "meme" entering public perception. Across the world, the idea of biologically distinct races took hold of the 20th century mindset to deadly effect. His favorable explanation of socio-biology is unnerving politically, but more importantly is claiming too much for biological determinism, and the link from biology to political decision-makjng is just too populist and nebulous.
A sharp rise in assimilation, highly PC nowadays in the West at least, because mixing of the races supposedly leads to greater understanding and peace, “may actually be the prelude to ethnic conflict,” he writes. For example, intermarriage of Jews with non-Jews was 1 in 3 in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1920s (and as high as 1 in 2 in some cities). Ferguson illustrates that in Germany, Jewish intermarriage rose from 2 percent in 1902 to 28 percent in 1933. These and other stats quoted by Ferguson prove nothing, of course, and support the arguments of neither persuasion.
Tensions along increasingly conscious ethnic faultlines frequently spilt over into conflict during periods of economic volatility. For extremities of wealth and poverty proved far more incendiary than the steady, immiserating effects of economic depression. When ethnicity and financial turbulence then occurred in the context of retreating or expanding empires - British, German, or Soviet - the capacity for bloodshed proved even greater, Ferguson argues. Better take out life insurance, everyone, because Ferguson is surely suggesting that what we’re going through now – levels of migration and market volatility unparalleled in any period – will lead to the biggest and bloodiest war ever. It’s nonsense!
He began to think “the war” was more a collection of multiple regional conflicts, whose origins and conclusions stretched beyond the usually accepted boundaries of 1939-1945—the war against China began in 1937, even 1931; and the one against the British, Dutch, and French empires ended in 1942. This argument is probably the most embarrassing and damaging to Ferguson because the title of his book is War of the World. The Second World War was so-called because at least one combatant, the UK, was a World Power and engaged its forces and resources generally globally and totally from September 1939 until August 1945. Before and after those dates there were wars, indeed, but they engaged regional powers only, or World Powers only in a limited way. .
From the Russian Revolution in 1905 to the massacres in Bosnia in the 1990s, Ferguson sees the world at war almost continuously throughout the last century. There weren't two world wars and a Cold War, but rather a single Hundred Years' War, he argues. If you like this sort of Big Picture, MegaTrends approach, the arguments behind two books will outlive Ferguson’s, EH Carr’s The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939 (1939) and Philip Bobbitt's The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (2002) on which sort of 20th century industrial nation state -- fascist, communist or parliamentarian -- would succeed to the legitimacy previously enjoyed by imperial state-nations in the 19th century. Personally I prefer a less bug-eyed view of history, The view that the 20th Century was one of Decline in the West and horrendous Death is incorrect and partial at best. As one who saw the pulling-down of the Berlin Wall first-hand and thought the collapse of the Soviet Empire a peaceful one, I have to say that an equally valid opinion of the 20th Century is one of peace, progress and prosperity, and one in which the whole world was bequeathed and wholeheartedly embraced the weltanschauung of the West.
Friday, 11 September 2009
Join the War, Politics & Strategy group on LinkedIn
It's just started and we have some great members around the world in the military, political advisory, and academic spheres of influence, and will shortly be organising discussion suppers in London.
Friday, 4 September 2009
A BOOK WORTH READING! Thinking About Peace And War, Martin Ceadel, OUP, 1987
Arguing that much of the debate about war and peace can be reduced to disagreements about ideology and assumptions about the nature of international politics, Martin Ceadel, founder of Oxford University's Department of Politics and International Relations, presents an engaging framework for studying the debate.
Militarism is the view that war is necessary to human development and thus a positive good. All wars are justified, even aggressive ones.
Crusading, whilst often indistinguishable from either defencism or pacificism, is distinctive for its willingness, under favourable circumstances, to use aggressive war to promote either order or justice, as those who follow this ideology conceive them. For them an aggressive war will help to prevent or abolish war in the longer term.
Someone taking a defencist position may argue that aggression is always wrong, but that defence is always right, therefore maintaining strong defence is the best way to prevent war.
Pacific-ism maintains that war is preventable in time, and that other reforms are also necessary, such as justice in domestic politics. This position derives from reforming philosophies such as liberalism, radicalism, socialism, feminism or the green movements.
Finally, pacifism as an ideology maintains that support for war is always impermissible. However, there are three varieties of pacifism. First, an optimistic version which argues that pacifism is the most effective defence policy to adopt because non-violence can deter or repel an invasion. The assumption here is that the international system is more a community than a society, possessing even stronger norms and institutions. Second, a mainstream version. Those arguing this believe that pacifism is not yet practical politics, but that it will be in the future. Meanwhile pacifists should, so far as their consciences allow, support pacificism as a step in the right direction. The assumption here is that the international system is already a society, but is capable of evolving into a community. Third, a pessimistic version which believes that pacifism is a faith rather than a political strategy. Consequently such pacifists can merely bear witness to those profound values which will be widely adopted only in the very long term when people eventually undergo a change of heart. This stance has been seen to occupy the moral high ground. It views the international system much like domestic politics - as 'a vale of tears'.
Ceadel covers these ideologies and their histories in a highly readable fashion in chapters 2-7, and ably explains how each ideology can be confused with its neighbours. I think he dismisses too complacently militarism, as this ideology is alive and well in many terrorist cells around the world because of their focus on using the military instrument as the first resort. Ceadel has demonstrated alot of interest over the years in pacifism, pacific-ism, socialism and other reforming philosophies espousing various forms of social justice, and subsequently he is so taken in by the public relations, rhetoric, and progaganda of terrorists, guerillas and insurgents that he categorises them as crusading (the ideology most akin to militarism) rather than militarist; from Che Guevara through the IRA to Muslim suicide bombers, their love of violence for its own sake viciously explodes into their spin-doctoring and tears the heart out of their humanity. They are the worst kind of militarist.
Not all militarists are completely evil and so consumed with violent hatred as Muslim extremists though. The impulse of ordinary soldiers just doing their jobs while admitting to enjoying the violence of war and looking forward to the next one (I've just finished Andy McNab's Bravo Two Zero) is a necessary though not sufficient part of militarism. Chuck Palahniuk's Fight Club dramatically illustrates the same hunger among some in the Men's Movement, although the author frames Tyler Durden, the thought-leading anti-hero, as a doomed psychopath. And Ceadel does attest to a thought-provoking counter-factual that it could have been militarism that spawned the anti-nuclear movement: if war is to be necessary to human development and thus a positive good, it could not logically allow the use or threat of nuclear weapons. So militarism isn't quite the spent force Ceadel thinks it is.
In the final chapter 8 on the determinants of the debate he outlines how well each ideology fares in historical contexts of how liberal the domestic political culture and how secure the state. Somewhat dissembling, I thought, he notes in the Appendix Kenneth Waltz's typology of the international system, which throughout the book underpinned much of Ceadel's analysis of the five ideologies at work. In the same Appendix he waffles on about Martin Wight's typology only to rubbish it when he could have used Wight's pupil Hedley Bull's much clearer and coherent analysis; indeed, in his frequent explanations of the five ideologies having assumptions about international politics being akin to, variously, a community, a society, and an anarchy, he is directly taking from Hedley Bull's simple and memorable typology. Chapter 8 would have been much more incisive, therefore, had he made more of Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society, Waltz's Man, the State, and War, and especially Barry Buzan's People, States & Fear, which itself uses Waltz's typology to build the seminal framework to analyse how secure a state and the international system is. Nevertheless, his explanation of the dynamics of the war-and-peace debate using the five ideologies is still erudite and insightful twenty years after publication, and a jolly good read!
Militarism is the view that war is necessary to human development and thus a positive good. All wars are justified, even aggressive ones.
Crusading, whilst often indistinguishable from either defencism or pacificism, is distinctive for its willingness, under favourable circumstances, to use aggressive war to promote either order or justice, as those who follow this ideology conceive them. For them an aggressive war will help to prevent or abolish war in the longer term.
Someone taking a defencist position may argue that aggression is always wrong, but that defence is always right, therefore maintaining strong defence is the best way to prevent war.
Pacific-ism maintains that war is preventable in time, and that other reforms are also necessary, such as justice in domestic politics. This position derives from reforming philosophies such as liberalism, radicalism, socialism, feminism or the green movements.
Finally, pacifism as an ideology maintains that support for war is always impermissible. However, there are three varieties of pacifism. First, an optimistic version which argues that pacifism is the most effective defence policy to adopt because non-violence can deter or repel an invasion. The assumption here is that the international system is more a community than a society, possessing even stronger norms and institutions. Second, a mainstream version. Those arguing this believe that pacifism is not yet practical politics, but that it will be in the future. Meanwhile pacifists should, so far as their consciences allow, support pacificism as a step in the right direction. The assumption here is that the international system is already a society, but is capable of evolving into a community. Third, a pessimistic version which believes that pacifism is a faith rather than a political strategy. Consequently such pacifists can merely bear witness to those profound values which will be widely adopted only in the very long term when people eventually undergo a change of heart. This stance has been seen to occupy the moral high ground. It views the international system much like domestic politics - as 'a vale of tears'.
Ceadel covers these ideologies and their histories in a highly readable fashion in chapters 2-7, and ably explains how each ideology can be confused with its neighbours. I think he dismisses too complacently militarism, as this ideology is alive and well in many terrorist cells around the world because of their focus on using the military instrument as the first resort. Ceadel has demonstrated alot of interest over the years in pacifism, pacific-ism, socialism and other reforming philosophies espousing various forms of social justice, and subsequently he is so taken in by the public relations, rhetoric, and progaganda of terrorists, guerillas and insurgents that he categorises them as crusading (the ideology most akin to militarism) rather than militarist; from Che Guevara through the IRA to Muslim suicide bombers, their love of violence for its own sake viciously explodes into their spin-doctoring and tears the heart out of their humanity. They are the worst kind of militarist.
Not all militarists are completely evil and so consumed with violent hatred as Muslim extremists though. The impulse of ordinary soldiers just doing their jobs while admitting to enjoying the violence of war and looking forward to the next one (I've just finished Andy McNab's Bravo Two Zero) is a necessary though not sufficient part of militarism. Chuck Palahniuk's Fight Club dramatically illustrates the same hunger among some in the Men's Movement, although the author frames Tyler Durden, the thought-leading anti-hero, as a doomed psychopath. And Ceadel does attest to a thought-provoking counter-factual that it could have been militarism that spawned the anti-nuclear movement: if war is to be necessary to human development and thus a positive good, it could not logically allow the use or threat of nuclear weapons. So militarism isn't quite the spent force Ceadel thinks it is.
In the final chapter 8 on the determinants of the debate he outlines how well each ideology fares in historical contexts of how liberal the domestic political culture and how secure the state. Somewhat dissembling, I thought, he notes in the Appendix Kenneth Waltz's typology of the international system, which throughout the book underpinned much of Ceadel's analysis of the five ideologies at work. In the same Appendix he waffles on about Martin Wight's typology only to rubbish it when he could have used Wight's pupil Hedley Bull's much clearer and coherent analysis; indeed, in his frequent explanations of the five ideologies having assumptions about international politics being akin to, variously, a community, a society, and an anarchy, he is directly taking from Hedley Bull's simple and memorable typology. Chapter 8 would have been much more incisive, therefore, had he made more of Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society, Waltz's Man, the State, and War, and especially Barry Buzan's People, States & Fear, which itself uses Waltz's typology to build the seminal framework to analyse how secure a state and the international system is. Nevertheless, his explanation of the dynamics of the war-and-peace debate using the five ideologies is still erudite and insightful twenty years after publication, and a jolly good read!
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