Man, the State, and War, Kenneth Waltz, 1959

Iran started enriching its own uranium this week. Why, if nuclear weapons ushered in an era of unprecedented peace, growth and wealth for those possessing them, should we not welcome the spread of nuclear weapons? Have the nuclear haves not always credited nuclear deterrence for banishing war between nuclear weapons states? This is the argument that Kenneth Waltz made in 1981, renewed in 2003, and which surely begs bringing back again this week.

Waltz's argument stems directly from the logic of nuclear deterrence and the balance of power, a concept he reinvigorated in his seminal text "Man, the State, and War". He starts by asking where the causes of war are to be found, and posits that they are to be found somewhere in the now-famous three “images” or levels of analysis in international politics. The first is human “behavior” (chapter 2), or more succinctly, human nature. If the causes of war are to be found here, one must divine the nature of human behaviour. Of course, there are as many views on human nature as humans on the planet, and thus how to secure peace will be equally indeterminate. Waltz counters all the human nature solutions to the causes of war and peace as being reductionist in chapter 3: by trying to explain everything, human behaviour images explain nothing. However, where I think this image could give clarity would be in focusing on decision-makers (heads of state, diplomats, generals, and so on) and their role in causing war and peace.

Waltz then looks in chapter 4 at a second image: domestic politics, or “the internal structure of states”. All political theories have a conception of the "good" state which is (with the exception of militarism) a peaceful one. We all know that democracies have never fought each other, the trouble is that there is little agreement as to what a democratic state consists of, let alone whether that is the only “good” state. Socialism has always been smug about its credentials of being good and peaceful; certainly, before the First World War, international socialists (ch5) believed that they could prevent war but they all ended up fighting for their own states. However, in these two chapters Waltz does highlight the importance of a state’s power, or its ability to act, and this along with the human behaviour of individual and group decision-makers will prove important when looking at all three images together. Just as the societies they live in make men, so the international environment makes states (page 122); the scene is set, therefore, to look at the third and final image which examines this international environment which makes states.

Chapter 6 introduces the international anarchy. With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire - conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur. To achieve a favorable outcome from such a conflict, a state has to rely on its own devices, the relative efficiency of which is its constant concern (p159).

In anarchy, there is no automatic harmony. Because some countries may be willing to use force to achieve their ends, and because there is no authority to prevent them from doing so, even peacefully inclined states arm themselves. Goodness and evil, agreement and disagreement, may or may not lead to war. War occurs because there is nothing to prevent it: there is no automatic adjustment of interests among states and there is a constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force (p188).

A balance of power may exist because some countries consciously make it the end of their policies, but it mainly exists because the system forces an equilibrium. It is not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by events on statesmen (p209).

The third image describes the framework of international politics, but without the first and the second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in international politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results (p238).

For Waltz, anarchy, or the absence of central authority, is the ordering principle of the international system. By analogy to microeconomic theory (ch7), Waltz argues that international systems emerge from self-regarding units coming into contact with each other. In a microtheory, whether economic or political, the motivation of actors is assumed rather than realistically described. Waltz assumes that states seek to ensure their survival. The real aims of states may be endlessly variable, but in a world without security, survival is the foundation for the theory.

Anarchy does not imply that violence is common in the international system but rather that the threat of violence is ever present. Anarchy means that the international system is one of self-help. Waltz identifies two ways in which the structure of the international system limits cooperation. First, the condition of insecurity--at the least, the uncertainty of each about the other's future intentions and actions--works against their cooperation. A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favour another state more than itself. Second, a state is also concerned about becoming dependent on others, and therefore also chooses to limit its cooperation with other states. Waltz sees virtues in anarchy--principally that states can preserve their autonomy.

While Waltz recognizes the existence of non-state actors, he dismisses their importance because states are still the most powerful actors on the world stage--they have the most influence and they set the rules. Thus, the international system is defined in terms of states.

The nature of the international system is determined by the number of Great Powers. The structure of the international system changes with changes in the distribution of power, and this is where the second level starts to play a larger role.

His Balance of Power Theory (pages 116-128 in chapter 6) is worthy of close reading and noting:
1. States are unitary actors who seek, at a minimum, their own preservation and, at a maximum, universal domination.
2. States seek to achieve their goals either through internal balancing (increasing economic and military strength) or external balancing (creating alliances).
3. For this theory to operate, we must see two or more states in a self-help system with no superior authority over them.

Finally, Waltz contrasts balancing with bandwagoning, in which weaker states choose to ally with the stronger state. Waltz argues that because power is a means not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions. Again, the structure of the international system and the necessity of survival dictate this behaviour.

In chapter 8, Waltz investigates how changes in the structure of the international system affect alliances. He focuses, in particular, on the difference between multipolar and bipolar alliance systems.

The primary difference between multipolar and bipolar balancing is that multipolar balancing occurs externally (among states), while bipolar balancing occurs internally. Because external balancing is more uncertain, bipolar balancing tends to produce less conflict.

Waltz discusses several additional features of multipolar balancing:
* States will woo alliance partners by adapting to them. Example: France and Russia attempting to appear more alike one another in order to form their alliance in 1894.
* For security, states are willing to align with anyone
* The weaker partner in an alliance will determine policy in a moment of crisis
* International competition will tend to force states in a multipolar order into two blocs.
* Having two blocs does not mean that the system is bipolar, because alliance shifts and defections can still occur.
* These alliance shifts and defections make the multipolar order dangerous.
* The flexibility of alliances makes for rigidity in strategy.

For bipolar alliances:
* Alliance leaders do not need to worry much about the faithfulness of followers.
* In bipolar systems, there will be unequal burden-sharing between the major and minor powers in an alliance.
* Great Powers in a bipolar system do not need to make themselves attractive to alliance partners. For example, the Soviet Union and the USA did not alter their strategies to accommodate allies
* The rigidity of bipolar alliances makes for flexible strategy

Criticisms: there is often not a balance but an imbalance created – in the EU, the weaker states seem to fawn on France and Germany and do their will; look at how everyone flocked to Microsoft Windows and all but abandoned Unix; likewise Google's 70%+ share of the search engine market; and not many will try to argue that the market is self-righting during this credit crunch (though quite clearly it is, with a vengeance)!

Waltz’ analysis underpins so many other famous texts that have come after his , including a number of the books I have reviewed in this blog. Another key text in the understanding of War, Politics & Strategy - Barry Buzan’s People States and Fear (which I will have to dust off and review) overtly uses Waltz’s three levels of analysis to study the concept of security.

Kenneth Payne in his Discussion Analogies and Afghanistan elegantly argued against placing too much emphasis on analogies, but Waltz's key contribution is to explain recurring patterns of state behaviour throughout history.

Experts may dispute how he explains the first two levels, and how these interact with each other, but they will all agree that his three-level analysis is a powerful way of comprehending the incomprehensible of parts of international politics. Waltz is in his element when he talks about the third level and argues that the world exists in a state of perpetual international anarchy.

Another great strength of Waltz’ analysis is his explanation of the function of Great Powers (and extrapolating from that, SuperPowers) in the interstate structure. It is upon this analysis that I commend his 1981 IISS Adelphi Paper on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons to you, and ask for your contribution in the light of the current hoo-haa over Iran.